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However, due to Burket's failures to raise the issue in the trial court52 and
assign it as error on appeal, 53 the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to
consider the merits of the issue. Burket's loss ofthe Simmons issue is yet
another example of how procedural default is a trap for the unwary.
Interestingly, in spite of Burket's guilty plea, the court nevertheless
reviewed the penalty phase issues raised by the defense. 54 This may
signal a movement away from the court's earlier pronouncements that
"[w)hen an accused enters a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty to an
55
offense he waives all defenses except those jurisdictional."
Much to the credit of the defense, an extensive case in mitigation
was put on in the penalty phase of the proceedings. Yet this very
presentation of evidence exemplifies why a capital defendant should not
plead guilty without an agreement that he will receive a sentence less than
death. By pleading guilty without such assurances, the defendant waives

all appellate questions regarding guidance ofjury discretion in sentencing56 and drastically reduces any chance of appellate relief.
Finally, the Burket decision confirms that as of yet, the Supreme
Court ofVirginia has not found any Fifth or Sixth Amendment problems
with any confession in the history of the modem capital murder statute.

52 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25.
53 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:17.
54
Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 613-16, 450 S.E.2d at 13335. Specifically, Burket argued that the trial court erred in finding the
prosecution's expert witness more credible than the defense expert
witnesses and in not considering all the evidence in mitigation. The
Court found these challenges to be without merit. Id.
55 Savino v. Commonwealth,239Va. 534,539,391 S.E.2d276,278
(1990). See also Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 131-32, 376
S.E.2d 288, 291 (1989).

56 For example, a meritorious and unresolved challenge to the
"vileness" factor may be lost because the trial judge is presumed to apply
a proper limiting construction. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639
(1990), reh'gdenied,497 U.S. 1050 (1990); see alsoLago,Litigatingthe
"Vileness" Factor,Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 25 (1991).
57 For a more thorough discussion of the state of confession law in
Virginia, see Bieber, Burket v. Commonwealth: Don't Put All Your
Defense Eggs in the SuppressionBasket, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.

V. Conclusion
The motion to suppress has not proven to be an effective tool for the
Virginia capital defendant. The motion should not be abandoned, but by
the same token the defense strategy certainly should not hinge on its
57
success.
Summary and analysis by:
Jody M. Bieber
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FACTS

HOLDING

Michael Wayne Williams was tried upon indictments charging him
with twelve felonies, five of which were capital murder charges for the
killing of Morris C. and Mary Elizabeth Keller. 1 At the guilt phase of a
bifurcated trial conducted under Virginia Code sections 19.2-264.3 and
264.4, a jury convicted Williams of all twelve charges. At the penalty
phase, the jury fixed the punishment for both capital murders at death
based on both the "future dangerousness" and "vileness" aggravators.
Williams appealed his capital murder convictions. 2 The Supreme Court
of Virginia consolidated his appeal with their automatic review of his
3
death sentences under Virginia Code section 17-110.1(A).

The Supreme Court of Virginia conducted its mandatory review of
the imposition of Davidson's death sentence, denied his appeal and
4
affirmed the trial court's actions.
Among the many issues raised and briefed on appeal, 5 the court
stated that it would not consider certain contentions by Williams because
they were not contained in his brief or were "incorporated by reference"
to arguments made in the trial court.
In response to Williams' argument that the Commonwealth is
required, by means of a bill or particulars, to "identify every narrowing
construction of [the "vileness"] factor on which it intends to offer

1 Two of the capital murder charges were based on Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-31 (d) (1990) (murder in the course of a robbery while armed with
a deadly weapon); two indictments were based on Va. Code Ann. § 18.231 (e) (1990) (murder subsequent to rape); the fifth indictment was based
on Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (g) (1990) (murder of more than one person
as a part of the same act or transaction).
2 Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528,532,450 S.E.2d 365,
369 (1994).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 528, 450 S.E.2d at 379.
5 Some of the errors briefed on appeal were rejected in brief,
conclusive language. Arguments in this category that will not be
addressed in this summary include: 1) the Virginia capital murder statute

does not give meaningful guidance to ajury because it does not require
the jury to find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances; (2) the statute fails to inform the jury that it must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors; (3) the statute fails to provide sufficient guidance to
the jury to assure that the death penalty is not applied arbitrarily or
capriciously; (4) the "future dangerousness" aggravator is inherently
misleading; (5) the part of the statute that allows a finding of "future
dangerousness" to be based on unadjudicated criminal conduct is unconstitutional; (6) if unadjudicated acts are allowed, the jury should be
instructed that they must only be considered if established beyond a
reasonable doubt; (7) the "future dangerousness" aggravator is inherently unreliable and insufficient to guide a jury's discretion; (8) the

CapitalDefense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2 - Page 21
evidence,"' 6 the court held that the language of the statute itself provided
the necessary narrowing construction and that due process does not
require the Commonwealth to give any other pre-trial constructions of
the statute. The court further held that Williams has no constitutional
right to a bill of particulars "if the indictments are sufficient to give him
notice of the nature and character of the offenses charged.., so that he
7
can make his defense."
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Procedural Default and the Fifty Page Brief Limit
The court refused to address certain assignments of error made by
Williams either because they were not included in the appellate brief at
all or were "incorporate[d] by reference." 8 The basis for this is the
requirement of Rule 5:28(e) that "[tihe principles of law, the argument
and the authorities relating to each question presented" be included in the
appellate brief. 9 This exclusion of issues fails to consider the Rule
5:26(a) requirement that briefs to the Supreme Court shall not "exceed
50 typed or 36 printed pages," 10 the default rules established under Rule
5:25, and the principle that state court remedies must be exhausted before
a federal court will consider assignments of error in a federal habeas
petition.
Taken together, these rules and principles require that all colorable
issues that may be made concerning errors that occurred at the trial court
level of a capital murder case must be raised at trial, included as
assignments of error, and briefed on appeal. If every issue is not included
at every stage, Virginia courts will strictly enforce default rules, includingRule 5:25, which states that"[e]rrorwill notbe sustainedto any ruling
of the trial court ... unless the objection was stated with reasonable

statute as administered is unconstitutional because it is imposed arbitrarily and disproportionately upon black defendants; (9) the statute is
unconstitutional because the death penalty is repugnant to evolving
standards of decency; (10) the statute is unconstitutional because meaningful appellate review is denied because the administration of the state
right to proportionality and passion/prejudice review is arbitrary; (11)
the statute violates the Eighth Amendment bar against cruel and unusual
punishment; and issues involving (12) the Sixth Amendment right to fair
trial; (13) and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against deprivation of the defendant's life without due process; (14) the denial of a
request by the defendant for sequestered voir dire and additional
preemptory challenges; and (15) the failure to provide additional discovery required under Rule 3A:l 1.
Other rulings provide little guidance because they apply broad,
settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case being
reviewed. Issues in this category that will not be addressed in this
summary include: (1) objections to the exclusion of prospective jurors
because no objection was made to their exclusion at trial; (2) denial of a
motion for change ofvenue due to pretrial publicity; (3) denial of motion
for assistance of a private investigator, (4) improper limitation on voir
dire; (5) failure to grant a mistrial; (6) improperly admitting prejudicial
photographs of victim and crime scene; (7) errors in the testimony of
witnesses; (8) improper cross-examination of the defendant; (9) improper admission of defendant's out-of-court statement; (10) improper
jury instructions; (11) insufficiency of the evidence; (12) double jeopardy violation; and (13) improper admission of photographs of other
murders at the penalty phase.
Defense counsel is to be commended for assigning and preserving
all of these issues for federal review.
6 Williams, 248 Va. at 538, 450 S.E.2d at 372.
7 Id.

certainty at the time of the ruling."' 1 Once an issue is defaulted at the
state level, federal courts have held that such a default, in the usual case,
precludes review of federal questions because it constitutes an adequate
and independent state ground of decision. 12 Thus once an issue is
13
defaulted, it may never be raised again.
The problem that arises in capital murder cases is that the breadth
of issues that must be raised is enormous because of the complexity and
instability of capital punishment law. No one can accurately predict what
changes will occur in the law, thus all colorable federal and state law
issues must be raised. The only certainty is that the client will more likely
face execution if issues are "narrowed" by default.
Traditional theories of appellate practice notwithstanding,
appellate counsel in a capital case should not raise only the best
of several potential issues. [footnote omitted]. Issues abandoned by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in
another case and ultimately successful, cannot necessarily be
reclaimed later. When a client will be killed if a case is lost,
counsel (and the courts) should not let any possible ground for
14
relief go unexplored or unexploited.
Both the American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Legal
Aid and Defenders Association (NLADA) have rejected the "narrow15
ing" strategy as a reasonable choice in capital cases.
This requirement to brief all colorable issues would normally
require appellate counsel to compile a brief that exceeds the fifty page
limit of Rule 5:26. Like most rules of procedure, the Supreme Court of
Virginia strictly applies this rule. 16 The most glaring example of the
misapplication of such rules occurred in Stockton v. Commonwealth. 17

8 Id. at 537, 450 S.E.2d 372.
9 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:28(e)(2).
10 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:26(a).
11 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25.
12 28 U.S.C. §2254(b) (1988). SeeDuggerv.Adams, 489 U.S. 401,
410 n.6 (1989); Murray v. Carrier,477 U.S. 478 (1986).
13 The only Virginia exception to this bar is "for good cause shown
or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice." Va. Sup. Ct. R.
5:23(e). This exception has been applied very rarely. For more
information on procedural default, see Groot, To Attain the Ends oJ
Justice:ConfrontingVirginia'sDefaultRules in CapitalCases, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 44 (1994); Powley, Perfecting the
Record ofa CapitalCasein Virginia,Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3,No.
1, p. 26 (1990).
14 Guidelinesfor the Appointment andPerformance ofCounsel in
Death PenaltyCases,Guidelines 11.9.2 Commentary (1989); Standards
for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalt)
Cases, Standard 11.9.2(d), Duties of Appellate Counsel, Commentary
(NLADA 1988).
15 Appellate counsel should seek, when perfecting the appeal, "tc
present all arguably meritorious issues, including challenges to an
overly restrictive appellate rules." Guidelinesfor the Appointment an
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guidelines 11.9.2.
Commentary (1989); Standardsfor the Appointment andPerformanc
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Standard 11.9.2(d), Duties o
Appellate Counsel, Commentary (NLADA 1988).
16 See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 450 S.E.2d 37
(1994) and case summary of Weeks, Capital Defense Digest, this issue
17 241 Va. 192,402 S.E.2d 196 (1991).
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Here the court refused to grant leave to Stockton to file a brief in excess
of the fifty page limit. When due to this denial assignments of error were
not able to be briefed, the court adhered to the default rules and would not
consider these assignments of error. 18
In Jones v. Barnes19 the United States Supreme Court restated the
conventional wisdom that appellate counsel should narrow the range of
issues to be considered by an appellate court.20 However, Jones was a
non-capital case, where it is proper to rely on the judgment of counsel to
determine which issues should or should not be raised. In the capital case
context, application ofprocedural rules and default rules by the Supreme
Court of Virginia in order to force counsel to "narrow" issues is
unacceptable because there is no room for the exercise of independent
judgment by counsel. Even the most competent counsel cannot determine which claims will be validated in the future and which claims
should be abandoned forever. It effectively forces counsel to disregard
the national standards set by the ABA and NLADA and to act in an
ineffective way. The right to effective assistance of counsel in a case
where potentially life-saving claims may be lost to default substantially
outweighs any interest a state may have in limiting the length of an
appellate brief.
Faced with these procedural rules, defense counsel in Virginia
should always move that the fifty page limit be waived when an appeal
is made. If this motion is denied, reconsideration should be requested. 21
If this request is denied also, several options remain, including: (1)
seeking a writ of mandamus from a federal court, (2) "incorporating by
reference" the weakest, yet still relevant, arguments that counsel has
previously raised, or (3) using one sentence arguments when briefing
claims that have been repeatedly rejected by Virginia courts. If the
Supreme Court of Virginia rejects these efforts to present claims for its
22
consideration, a new issue is created.
These mechanisms at least raise the possibility that a Virginia
determination of default based on these "Catch-22" procedures may not
be honored by the federal courts. There are federal precedents that could
serve as a basis for overcoming these default rules. Some require that the
state procedural rule must serve a state interest other than to frustrate
federal rights.23 Others hold a procedural rule may not act as a bar where
the petitioner has substantially complied with the rule but defaulted in

some technical sense,24 the claim allegedly defaulted falls within an
exception to the rule, 25 or the rule is discretionary. 26 Therefore, it may
be argued that the rule itself is invalid and thus no default has occurred.
Finally, the federal court may agree that although there is a default, there
is cause for that default which will allow the federal court to hear the
issue. 27

18 Id. at 217, 402 S.E.2d at 210.
19 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
20 Id. at 751-54.
21 Another argument could be made that because the Supreme
Court of Virginia is required by law to undertake a passion/prejudice
review and proportionality review of any capital sentence, that any pages
used in briefing assignments of errors concerning these areas should not
be counted in the fifty page limit or, alternatively, that a separate brief
should be allowed to be submitted by the defense which specifically
addresses these areas.
22 For a comprehensive discussion of default, federal review, and
the fifty page limit, see Ahrend, Beating a PotentialDeathtrap:How to
Preservethe Appellate RecordforFederalReview andAvoid Virginia's
ProceduralDefault, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
23 James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1984).
24 Id. See White v. Sowders, 644 F.2d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1981)
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 853 (1981).
25 Johnson v. Mississippi,486 U.S. 578, 587-89 (1988); Hathorn
v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,262-65 (1982); County Court of Ulster County
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 150-51 n.8, 10 (1979).
26 Johnson v. Mississippi,486 U.S. at 587-89; Hathorn v. Lovorn,
457 U.S. at 262-65; Sullivan v. Little HuntingPark,Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
233-34 (1969).
27 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,92-94 (1977).
28 Williams, 248 Va. 528, 538, 450 S.E.2d 365, 372.

29 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(c) (1990). See Tuilaepa v.
California, 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994) (the factors for determining a
defendant's eligibility for death may not be vague) and case summary of
Tuilaepa, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 8 (1994).
30 Gardnerv. Florida,430 U.S. 349 (1977) (holding that reliance
by court on confidential presentence report that was not made available
to the defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it denied
him the opportunity to "deny or explain" such information); Simmons v.
South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2194 (1994) (holding that the Due
Process Clause does not allow the execution of a person on the basis of
information which he had no opportunity to "deny or explain").
31 Godfrey v. Georgia,446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) ("There is
nothing in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent
restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence.
A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every
murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."');
Maynard v. Cartwright,486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988) (rejected argument
that "a particular set of facts surrounding a murder, however shocking
they might be, were enough in themselves, and without some narrowing
principle to apply to those facts, to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty.").
32 Gardnerv. Flordia,430 U.S. 349 (1977); Skipper v. South
Carolina,476 U.S. 1 (1986); Simmons v. South Carolina,114 S. Ct. 2187
(1994).

II. Bill of Particulars
The court addressed Williams' contention that due process requires
that he receive pretrial notification, by a bill ofparticulars, of the limiting
constructions of the "vileness" aggravating factor of the capital murder
statuteupon which theprosecution intended to rely at trial. The court held
that: (1) due process does not require such notification pretrial, (2) that
there is no constitutional right to a bill of particulars if the indictments are
sufficient to give notice of the nature and character of the offenses
charged, and (3) that the necessary narrowing constructions are contained in the statute itself. 28
The Virginia statutory scheme casts the aggravating factors as
elements of the state's case for death. Persons found guilty of capital
murder are not eligible for a sentence of death unless and until the
Commonwealth has proven either "future dangerousness" or "vileness"
beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard applicable to elements
of an offense. 29 Separate from the issue of the utility of these factors in
guiding the discretion of the sentencing jury, the defendant has a due
process right to defend against the state's case for death. 30 Notice and
the opportunity to be heard are the foundation of this due process right.
The United State Supreme Court cases which held that the statutory
language of the "vileness" and "heinousness" factors are inadequate to
guide capital sentencingjuries also illustrate the impossibility of defend31
ing against these factors.
The United States Supreme Court has been equally clear that capital
defendant's have a due process right to defend against the state's case for
death. 32 In Virginia the aggravating factors of "future dangerousness"
or "vileness" are the elements of the state's case for death, because
persons found guilty of capital murder are not eligible for a sentence of

CapitalDefense Digest,Vol. 7, No. 2 - Page23
death unless one ofthese two aggravators areproven beyond a reasonable
33
doubt at the penalty phase of the capital murder trial.
In the face of these constitutional requirements, the Supreme Court
of Virginia held in Williams that: (1) defendants are not even entitled to
pretrial notice that the Commonwealth will rely on either or both of the
statutory elements of its case for death, (2) directly contrary to Godfrey,
the language of the "vileness" factor is not vague, 34 and (3) the statutory
language is vague, but the definitions of the terms found in Smith v.
Commonwealth35 provide sufficient explanation. 36 The court previously held in Clark v. Commonwealth that the Smith definitions were
"not the best or the only ones." 37 The court in Williams, however, refers
to the Smith definitions as "necessary," implying that they are the only
acceptable constructions. 38 To confuse the matter further, the Supreme
Court has also held that vagueness in the statutory language of an
aggravating factor is not cured by a narrowing construction that is itself
unconstitutionally vague. 39 The Smith definitions are certainly suspect
under Shell, notwithstanding the cursory approval given to them in
40
Turnerv. Murray.

Williams illustrates that the Supreme Court of Virginia is all over
the map in its efforts to uphold the application of Virginia's vague
aggravating factors. Both defendants and jurors are left in the dark
because of these efforts.
Defense counsel should continue to move for a bill of particulars
that includes all the narrowing constructions of the capital statute
aggravators on which the Commonwealth intends to rely. The brief in
support of this motion must frame the issue as a federal question, so that
if this motion is denied, the issue may be preserved for later argument to
a federal court if necessary. It is clear that Virginia courts are not
sympathetic to this claim; however, it seems inevitable that a federal
court will eventually take up this issue. It is vital that this issue be raised
and preserved at every stage to assure than when the federal courts take
the opportunity to appropriately apply the United States Constitution to
Virginia's aggravating factors, no clients will be "defaulted out" of the
benefit of that favorable ruling.

33 Tuilaepa, supra note 29.
34 Williams, 248 Va. at 538, 450 S.E.2d 372 ("The necessary
narrowing constructions are contained in the emphasized language of the
Code § 19.2-264.4(C)" and indictments which contained this statutory
language were "sufficient to give him notice of the nature and character
of the offenses charged ....).
35 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978) (defined the terms "aggravated battery" and "depravity of mind").

36 Williams, 248 Va. at 538,450 S.E.2d at 372.
37 220 Va. 201,257 S.E.2d 784 (1979).
38 Williams, 248 Va. at 538, 450 S.E.2d at 372.
39 Shell v. Mississippi,498 U.S. 1 (1990) (held that there was no
meaningful distinction between the limiting construction and the
"vileness" factor itself and thus a person of ordinary sensibilities would
still be able to characterize almost every murder as falling within its
limits).
40 476 U.S. 28 (1986).

Summary and analysis by:
Timothy B. Heavner

JOSEPH v. COMMONWEALTH
452 S.E.2d 862 (Va. 1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On the evening of October 26, 1992, Jason M. Joseph and an
accomplice, Kiasi Powell, entered a Subway Shop in Portsmouth,
Virginia. Joseph ordered a sandwich from Anderson who was behind the
counter. As the sandwich was being prepared, Joseph displayed a pistol
and ordered Anderson to open the register. Joseph then ordered Anderson to hand him the cash drawer and to get down on the floor behind the
counter. After receiving the drawer, Joseph indicated his intention to
shoot Anderson. Subsequently, Joseph reached over the counter, shot
and killed Anderson. 1
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, pursuant to Virginia Code
sections 19.2-264.3 and 19.2-264.4, a jury convicted Joseph of capital
murder, robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, the use of a firearm
1 Joseph v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 862, 864-65 (Va. 1995).
2 Id. at 864.
3 The court rejected some of the defendant's assignments of error
in brief, conclusive language. Others did not involve death penalty law.
On still others, the rulings provide little if any guidance because they
apply broad, settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case
being reviewed. Issues in these categories that will not be addressed in
this summary include: (1) denial of an"Allen charge" and (2) sufficiency
of the evidence of "future dangerousness." Further, some claims were
found to have been defaulted or made solely on state law grounds,
probably barring federal review. Claims falling in these categories
included: (1) objection to Commonwealth voir dire questions (defaulted)

while committing murder, robbery and the use of a firearm while
committing murder. His punishment was fixed at imprisonment for life
on the robbery conviction and four years imprisonment for each firearnu
conviction. In the second stage of the capital murder trial, the jury fixed
Joseph's punishment at death based on "future dangerousness." 2
HOLDING
In accordance with Virginia Code sections 17-110.1(A) and 17.
110.1(F), the Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the automatic
review of Joseph's death sentence with his appeal of the capital murdei
conviction and other convictions on appeal. The court then upheld the
3
convictions and death sentence.

and (2) objection to duplicative photographs (state law grounds). Fo
discussion ofplacing federal law grounds in all claims, see case summar3
of Cardwell, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. For discussion o
avoiding procedural default, see Breardv. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68
445 S.E.2d 670 (1994), and case summary of Breard, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 19 (1994); Pruettv. Thompson, 996 F.2d 156(
(4th Cir. 1993), and case summary of Pruett, Capital Defense Digest
Vol. 6, No. 1,p. 15 (1993). For a discussion on how to avoid procedura
default, see Groot, To Attain the Ends ofJustice:Confronting Virginia'.
DefaultRules in CapitalCases,Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p
44 (1994).

